- GitLab CI/CD job token security
- Configure CI/CD job token access
- Download an artifact from a different pipeline
- Troubleshooting
GitLab CI/CD job token
When a pipeline job is about to run, GitLab generates a unique token and injects it as the
CI_JOB_TOKEN
predefined variable.
You can use a GitLab CI/CD job token to authenticate with specific API endpoints:
- Packages:
- Package registry.
- Packages API (project-level).
-
Container registry
(the
$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD
is$CI_JOB_TOKEN
). -
Container registry API
(scoped to the job’s project, when the
ci_job_token_scope
feature flag is enabled).
- Get job artifacts.
- Get job token’s job.
-
Pipeline triggers, using the
token=
parameter to trigger a multi-project pipeline. - Update pipeline metadata
- Releases and Release links.
- Terraform plan.
- Deployments.
- Environments.
The token has the same permissions to access the API as the user that caused the job to run. A user can cause a job to run by taking action like pushing a commit, triggering a manual job, or being the owner of a scheduled pipeline. Therefore, this user must be assigned to a role that has the required privileges.
The token is valid only while the pipeline job runs. After the job finishes, you cannot use the token anymore.
A job token can access a project’s resources without any configuration, but it might give extra permissions that aren’t necessary. There is a proposal to redesign the feature for more strategic control of the access permissions.
You can also use the job token to authenticate and clone a repository from a private project in a CI/CD job:
git clone https://gitlab-ci-token:${CI_JOB_TOKEN}@gitlab.example.com/<namespace>/<project>
You can’t use a job token to push to a repository, but issue 389060 proposes to change this behavior.
GitLab CI/CD job token security
To make sure that this token doesn’t leak, GitLab:
- Masks the job token in job logs.
- Grants permissions to the job token only when the job is running.
To make sure that this token doesn’t leak, you should also configure your runners to be secure. Avoid:
- Using Docker
privileged
mode if the machines are re-used. - Using the
shell
executor when jobs run on the same machine.
If you have an insecure GitLab Runner configuration, you increase the risk that someone tries to steal tokens from other jobs.
Configure CI/CD job token access
You can control what projects a CI/CD job token can access to increase the job token’s security. A job token might give extra permissions that aren’t necessary to access specific private resources.
When enabled, and the job token is being used to access a different project:
- The user that executes the job must be a member of the project that is being accessed.
- The user must have the permissions to perform the action.
- The accessed project must have the project attempting to access it added to the allowlist.
If a job token is leaked, it could potentially be used to access private data to the job token’s user. By limiting the job token access scope, project data cannot be accessed unless projects are explicitly authorized.
There is a proposal to add more strategic control of the access permissions, see epic 3559.
CI_REGISTRY_TOKEN
uses CI_JOB_TOKEN
to authenticate, the access configuration
also applies to CI_REGISTRY_TOKEN
.Allow access to your project with a job token
-
Introduced in GitLab 15.9. Deployed behind the
:inbound_ci_scoped_job_token
feature flag, enabled by default. - Feature flag removed in GitLab 15.10.
Create an allowlist of projects which can access your project through
their CI_JOB_TOKEN
.
For example, project A
can add project B
to the allowlist. CI/CD jobs
in project B
(the “allowed project”) can now use their CI/CD job token to
authenticate API calls to access project A
.
By default, the allowlist of any project only includes itself.
It is a security risk to disable this feature, so project maintainers or owners should keep this setting enabled at all times. Add projects to the allowlist only when cross-project access is needed.
Limit job token scope for public or internal projects
Projects can use a job token to authenticate with public or internal projects for the following actions without being added to the allowlist:
- Fetch artifacts
- Access the container registry
- Access the package registry
- Access releases, deployments, and environments
To limit access to these actions to only the projects on the allowlist, set the visibility of each feature to be only accessible to project members:
Prerequisites:
- You must have the Maintainer role for the project.
- On the left sidebar, select Search or go to and find your project.
- Select Settings > General.
- Expand Visibility, project features, permissions.
- Set the visibility to Only project members for the features you want to restrict access to.
- The ability to fetch artifacts is controlled by the CI/CD visibility setting.
- Select Save changes.
Triggering pipelines and fetching Terraform plans is not affected by feature visibility.
Disable the job token scope allowlist
Allow access to this project with a CI_JOB_TOKEN setting renamed to Limit access to this project in GitLab 16.3.
You can disable the job token scope allowlist for testing or a similar reason, but you should enable it again as soon as possible.
Prerequisites:
- You must have at least the Maintainer role for the project.
To disable the job token scope allowlist:
- On the left sidebar, select Search or go to and find your project.
- Select Settings > CI/CD.
- Expand Token Access.
- Toggle Limit access to this project to disabled. Enabled by default in new projects.
You can also disable the allowlist with the API.
Add a project to the job token scope allowlist
Allow access to this project with a CI_JOB_TOKEN setting renamed to Limit access to this project in GitLab 16.3.
You can add projects to the allowlist for a project. Projects added to the allowlist can make API calls from running pipelines by using the CI/CD job token.
Prerequisites:
- You must have at least the Maintainer role in the current project. If the allowed project is internal or private, you must have at least the Guest role in that project.
- You must not have more than 200 projects added to the allowlist.
To add a project:
- On the left sidebar, select Search or go to and find your project.
- Select Settings > CI/CD.
- Expand Token Access.
- Verify Limit access to this project is enabled.
- Under Allow CI job tokens from the following projects to access this project, add projects to the allowlist.
You can also add a target project to the allowlist with the API.
Limit your project’s job token access
-
Introduced in GitLab 14.1. Deployed behind the
:ci_scoped_job_token
feature flag, disabled by default. - Enabled on GitLab.com and self-managed in GitLab 14.4.
- Feature flag removed in GitLab 14.6.
Control your project’s job token scope by creating an allowlist of projects which can be accessed by your project’s job token.
By default, the allowlist includes your current project. Other projects can be added and removed by maintainers with access to both projects.
With the setting disabled, all projects are considered in the allowlist and the job token is limited only by the user’s access permissions.
For example, when the setting is enabled, jobs in a pipeline in project A
have
a CI_JOB_TOKEN
scope limited to project A
. If the job needs to use the token
to make an API request to project B
, then B
must be added to the allowlist for A
.
Configure the job token scope
Limit CI_JOB_TOKEN access setting renamed to Limit access from this project in GitLab 16.3.
Prerequisites:
- You must not have more than 200 projects added to the token’s scope.
To configure the job token scope:
- On the left sidebar, select Search or go to and find your project.
- Select Settings > CI/CD.
- Expand Token Access.
- Toggle Limit access from this project to enabled.
- Optional. Add existing projects to the token’s access scope. The user adding a project must have the Maintainer role in both projects.
Download an artifact from a different pipeline
You can use the CI/CD job token to authenticate with the jobs artifacts API endpoint and fetch artifacts from a different pipeline. You must specify which job to retrieve artifacts from:
build_submodule:
stage: test
script:
- apt update && apt install -y unzip
- curl --location --output artifacts.zip "https://gitlab.example.com/api/v4/projects/1/jobs/artifacts/main/download?job=test&job_token=$CI_JOB_TOKEN"
- unzip artifacts.zip
Troubleshooting
CI job token failures are usually shown as responses like 404 Not Found
or similar:
-
Unauthorized Git clone:
$ git clone https://gitlab-ci-token:$CI_JOB_TOKEN@gitlab.com/fabiopitino/test2.git Cloning into 'test2'... remote: The project you were looking for could not be found or you don't have permission to view it. fatal: repository 'https://gitlab-ci-token:[MASKED]@gitlab.com/<namespace>/<project>.git/' not found
-
Unauthorized package download:
$ wget --header="JOB-TOKEN: $CI_JOB_TOKEN" ${CI_API_V4_URL}/projects/1234/packages/generic/my_package/0.0.1/file.txt --2021-09-23 11:00:13-- https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/1234/packages/generic/my_package/0.0.1/file.txt Resolving gitlab.com (gitlab.com)... 172.65.251.78, 2606:4700:90:0:f22e:fbec:5bed:a9b9 Connecting to gitlab.com (gitlab.com)|172.65.251.78|:443... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 404 Not Found 2021-09-23 11:00:13 ERROR 404: Not Found.
-
Unauthorized API request:
$ curl --verbose --request POST --form "token=$CI_JOB_TOKEN" --form ref=master "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/1234/trigger/pipeline" < HTTP/2 404 < date: Thu, 23 Sep 2021 11:00:12 GMT {"message":"404 Not Found"} < content-type: application/json
While troubleshooting CI/CD job token authentication issues, be aware that:
- A GraphQL example mutation is available to toggle the scope settings per project.
-
This comment
demonstrates how to use GraphQL with Bash and cURL to:
- Enable the inbound token access scope.
- Give access to project B from project A, or add B to A’s allowlist.
- To remove project access.
- The CI job token becomes invalid if the job is no longer running, has been erased, or if the project is in the process of being deleted.